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GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 
 Defendant Stephayne McClure-Potts appeals a five-
month sentence rendered after pleading guilty to one count of 
Social Security Fraud, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(6), 
and one count of Harboring an Illegal Alien, in violation of 8 
U.S.C. §§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii) and (a)(2).  For the following 
reasons, we will affirm.  
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I. FACTS 
 This case arises out of the personal relationship between 
defendant Stephayne McClure-Potts and Artur Samarin, a 
young man who entered into the United States without 
inspection from the Ukraine and ultimately settled in 
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.  In August of 2015, McClure-Potts 
contacted local police to report “Homeland Security issues” 
with Samarin, whom she claimed she and her husband were in 
the process of trying to adopt despite his being nineteen years 
of age at the time.  PSR ¶ 5.  She claimed that Samarin had 
recently been “speaking of Hitler against the Jews” and 
asserted that he may have stolen a rifle from his school.  Id.  
McClure-Potts would go on to provide a birth certificate for 
Samarin indicating a birth year of 1992, as well as expired 
immigration visas and an application to change the nature of 
Samarin’s visa.   
 Police investigated the reports and discovered that 
McClure-Potts had twice previously filed runaway reports 
regarding a minor son—Asher Potts—who supposedly was 
born on September 3, 1997.  They also discovered that Samarin 
was posing as a minor named Asher Potts and attending John 
Harris High School in Harrisburg.  The school provided a 
number of documents pertaining to Samarin, including a sworn 
statement from McClure-Potts dating from 2012 claiming that 
Samarin was born on September 3, 1997, as well as 
applications for free/reduced lunch and health benefits.       
 In an interview after the above discoveries, McClure-
Potts explained that Samarin had come to the United States in 
2012 via an exchange program and befriended her and her 
husband after he was assaulted by a group of “Russian boys.”  
PSR ¶ 9.  She also claimed that, as they assisted Samarin in 
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addressing his immigration issues at the time, he claimed to be 
only fourteen years old.  She did provide a passport for Samarin 
indicating his birth year was 1992.   
 In an interview with authorities, Samarin explained that 
he had gotten to know McClure-Potts and her husband by 
visiting the convenience store where she worked.  He said that 
he had expressed his desire to stay in the United States and that 
McClure-Potts and her husband offered to help him do so.  
According to Samarin, this assistance included their offer for 
him to live with them, their offer to change his birthdate to 
allow their adoption of him, to get him enrolled in school, and 
to retain an immigration attorney (albeit McClure-Potts took 
$2,000 from Samarin to hire the attorney).  Samarin agreed and 
moved in with McClure-Potts and her husband.   
 Samarin contends that, once he moved in, the situation 
changed.  According to him, he was told to cut all ties with his 
family, and his identification documents were taken from him.  
He also was purportedly forced to do household work, 
McClure-Potts’s own college schoolwork, and to turn over to 
McClure-Potts and her husband any money he received from 
work or grants.   
 On July 17, 2014, McClure-Potts obtained a Social 
Security card issued under Samarin’s new alias, Asher Potts, 
after going to the Social Security Harrisburg District Office by 
herself ten times.  According to the PSR, during this time, 
McClure-Potts and her husband used the applied-for and 
ultimately secured Social Security number obtained for 
Samarin in the name of Asher Potts born in 1997 to procure 
$7,336 worth of credits on income tax returns and $13,653.28 
in nutritional and health benefits between 2012 and 2015 that 
they were not entitled to.   
Case: 17-2987     Document: 003113081943     Page: 4      Date Filed: 11/08/2018
5 
 
 On October 19, 2016, McClure-Potts was named, along 
with her husband, in an indictment filed in the United States 
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania.  The 
indictment charged McClure-Potts with one count of Social 
Security Fraud, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(6); one count 
of Harboring an Illegal Alien, in violation of 8 U.S.C. 
§§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii) and (a)(2); and one count of Unlawful 
Conduct Respecting Documents in Furtherance of Forced 
Labor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589 and 1590.  Pursuant 
to a plea agreement, McClure-Potts pled guilty to the Social 
Security Fraud and Harboring counts.   
 McClure-Potts filed objections to the Presentencing 
Investigation Report (“PSR”), including the two issues raised 
here on appeal: namely, the amount of the calculated loss and 
the refusal to grant an offense level reduction due to the claim 
that her fraud was committed “other than for profit.”  See PSR 
Addendum.  The amount of loss calculated by the Probation 
Office—$20,989.28—had resulted in an increase of four 
offense levels, while the refusal to grant McClure-Potts’s 
request for a reduction cost her a potential three-level reduction 
in total offense level.   
 At sentencing, the District Court adopted the PSR 
without change and sentenced McClure-Potts to five months in 
prison.  This appeal followed.  
  
Case: 17-2987     Document: 003113081943     Page: 5      Date Filed: 11/08/2018
6 
 
II. DISCUSSION1 
 On appeal, McClure-Potts raises three arguments: (1) 
that she harbored Samarin “other than for profit” under 
U.S.S.G. § 2L1.1(b)(1) and therefore that she should have 
received a three-point reduction to her total offense level; (2) 
that the District Court clearly erred by crediting Samarin’s 
testimony of the events over that of McClure-Potts; and (3) that 
the District Court mistakenly calculated the total loss that 
resulted from McClure-Potts’s crimes and therefore erred by 
increasing her total offense level by four pursuant to U.S.S.G. 
§ 2B1.1(b)(1)(C).  For the reasons discussed below, we find 
none of these arguments to be persuasive.  We will therefore 
affirm the District Court’s judgment of conviction.  
A. U.S.S.G. § 2L1.1(b)(1). 
 McClure-Potts contends that the District Court erred by 
not reducing her total offense level points by three pursuant to 
U.S.S.G. § 2L1.1(b)(1).  “On appeal, [w]e review the District 
Court’s interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo, 
and scrutinize any findings of fact for clear error.” United 
States v. Kluger, 722 F.3d 549, 555 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting 
                                              
 1 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction 
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
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United States v. Aquino, 555 F.3d 124, 127 n.5 (3d Cir. 2009)).2  
Section 2L1.1(b)(1) of the Guidelines provides: 
If (A) the offense was committed other than for 
profit, or the offense involved the smuggling, 
transporting, or harboring only of the 
defendant’s spouse or child (or both the 
defendant’s spouse and child), and (B) the base 
offense level is determined under subsection 
(a)(3), decrease by 3 levels.  
U.S.S.G. § 2L1.1(b)(1).  Prior to 1997, § 2L1.1(b)(1), 
Application Note One of that section read (in pertinent part):  
“For profit” means for financial gain or 
commercial advantage, but this definition does 
not include a defendant who commits the offense 
solely in return for his own entry or 
transportation. 
U.S.S.G. § 2L1.1(b)(1), App. n.1 (1995).  However, in 1997, 
the Sentencing Commission deleted the 1995 commentary 
definition of “for profit” and substituted it for a definition for 
the phrase “other than for profit.”  U.S.S.G. § 2L1.1(b)(1), 
                                              
 2 To the extent that the District Court’s decision can be 
construed as an application of the Guidelines rather than as an 
interpretation of them, then the standard of review is for abuse 
of discretion.  See Kluger, 722 F.3d at 555 (“[W]e review the 
District Court’s application of the Guidelines to facts for abuse 
of discretion.”).  However, which standard applies here is not 
critical to our decision, as we would affirm under either a de 
novo or abuse of discretion standard. 
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App. n.1 (1997) (henceforth “Application Note One”).  
Accordingly, Application Note One now provides:    
“The offense was committed other than for 
profit” means that there was no payment or 
expectation of payment for the smuggling, 
transporting, or harboring of any of the unlawful 
aliens. 
 
Id.  According to the Sentencing Commission, the stated 
purpose of the amendment was to narrow the class of offenders 
who could benefit from § 2L1.1(b)(1) pursuant to the 
immigration laws: 
Reason for Amendment: This amendment 
implements section 203 of the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub.L. 104-208, 110 
Stat. 3009, which directs the Commission to 
amend the guidelines for offenses related to 
smuggling, transporting, or harboring illegal 
aliens.  Pursuant to the emergency amendment 
authority of that Act, this amendment previously 
was promulgated as a temporary measure 
effective May 1, 1997.  This version of the 
amendment changes § 
2L1.1(b)(1)(A)(pertaining to a reduction for 
non-profit offenses) to narrow somewhat the 
class of cases that would qualify for the reduced 
offense level under that provision.  This 
amendment also makes a conforming change to 
§ 5K2.0.  
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U.S.S.G., Amendment 561 (1997).  This definition, which 
remains presently in effect, typically applies to cases in which 
a defendant is paid to smuggle, transport, or harbor one or more 
aliens.  See, e.g., United States v. Chavez-Palacios, 30 F.3d 
1290 (10th Cir. 1994); United States v. Puac-Zamora, 56 F.3d 
1385 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Zaldivar, 615 F.3d 1346 
(11th Cir. 2010).  Thus, as the Government concedes, “this 
case falls outside the most common class of cases where the 
application of this particular guideline becomes an issue – i.e., 
determining whether a defendant accepted payment in return 
for smuggling illegal aliens into the country.”  Gov’t Br. at 16.  
At issue, therefore, is whether McClure-Potts’s receipt of 
various government benefits—i.e., tax credits, social security, 
food/medical assistance, etc.—constitutes behavior “other than 
for profit”; if it does, then she should receive a reduction of 
three criminal points; otherwise, she cannot benefit from the 
provision.   
 McClure-Potts’s primary contention is precisely that—
courts deny the three-level reduction “in circumstances where 
the harboring was indeed ‘for profit’, where the record 
established a very specific quid pro quo: payment to the 
harboring defendant from the unlawful alien for the particular 
purpose of facilitating illegal entry.”3  Appellant Br. at 19.  
According to her, unlike those cases, “[h]ere, the record 
demonstrates that [she] did not harbor Samarin ‘for profit’, as 
                                              
 3 As a mitigating factor regarding her sentencing, it is 
McClure-Potts’s burden to demonstrate that she was entitled to 
the benefit of § 2L1.1(b)(1).  See Zaldivar, 615 F.3d at 1352 
(“It is [the defendant’s] burden to prove that the Guidelines’ 
section which would reduce his sentence is applicable to 
him.”). 
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Samarin provided no quid pro quo; he gave nothing to her for 
the purpose of facilitating illegal entry—especially considering 
that all agree that he was already present in the United States 
when they met—or for any other reason, including his room, 
board, and all the other expenses Potts expended on his 
behalf.”  Id. at 20.   
 She also contends that, while her receipt of government 
benefits may have met the pre-1997 definition of private 
financial gain, they also meet the current and distinct definition 
of “other than for profit.”  Id. at 24.  First, she explicitly 
avoided pleading guilty to harboring an alien for “commercial 
advantage and private financial gain,” and that the Government 
specifically deleted this language—which appears in the plea 
agreement—from the indictment:  
The defendant agrees to plead guilty to Counts 1 
and 2, as it relates solely to harboring aliens and 
not for the purpose of commercial advantage or 
private financial gain.  
Id. at 22 (quoting App. 19).  In her estimation, the distinction 
between “private financial gain” and “for profit” is significant 
because “[w]hile perhaps the benefits could be considered, 
theoretically, as some species of ‘private financial gain’—the 
very language that the Government deleted from the 
indictment—there seems to be no precedent for characterizing 
receipt of these benefits on behalf of someone who appears to 
be a dependent as ‘for profit’.”  Appellant Br. at 23.  She relies 
on United States v. Kim, 193 F.3d 567 (2d Cir. 1999), where 
the Second Circuit found that the 1997 amendment to 
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Application Note One constituted a substantive change as 
opposed to a clarification of the definition’s scope.4    
                                              
 4 The Second Circuit explained: 
The 1997 amendments to § 2L1.1 were not 
accompanied by any statement that the Commission 
intended the change in Application Note 1 simply as a 
clarification. See Guidelines Appendix C, Amendment 
543 (1997). Instead, the amendments made numerous 
changes in the guideline and its commentary, and the 
Commission characterized the changes, in bulk, as 
“implement[ing] section 203 of the Illegal Immigration 
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 
Pub.L. 104–208, 110 Stat. 3009–566, which directs the 
Commission to amend the guidelines for offenses 
related to smuggling, transporting, or harboring illegal 
aliens.” Guidelines Appendix C, Amendment 543 
(1997). We see nothing in this statement to suggest that 
the Commission amended Application Note 1 merely to 
clarify the Commission’s original intent. 
Further, on its face, the 1997 change to Application 
Note 1 appears to effect a substantial change in scope 
rather than to clarify. Plainly, a “commercial 
advantage” may encompass more than a simple 
“payment or expectation of payment.” Had it been the 
Sentencing Commission’s original intent that the “for 
profit” concept be restricted narrowly to payment or 
expectation of payment, we doubt that the Commission 
would have chosen to express that restriction in terms 
so broad as “commercial advantage.” 
Case: 17-2987     Document: 003113081943     Page: 11      Date Filed: 11/08/2018
12 
 
  However, the language of § 2L1.1(b)(1) is expansive 
and is broad enough to cover McClure-Potts’s conduct.  That 
this case does not involve the typical quid pro quo or facts 
involving the typical § 2L1.1(b)(1) case does not, on its face, 
mean that the potential three-level reduction inures to her 
benefit.  First, the text of the Application Note does not require 
that payment be made by the unlawful alien himself—it merely 
says that “other than for profit” means “that there was no 
payment or expectation of payment for the . . . harboring of any 
of the unlawful aliens.”  U.S.S.G. § 2L1.1(b)(1), App. n.1.  
Accordingly, McClure-Potts’s argument that “Samarin . . . 
gave nothing to her for the purpose of facilitating illegal entry 
. . . or for any other reason” is irrelevant.  Appellant Br. at 20.  
See United States v. Al Nasser, 555 F.3d 722, 733 (9th Cir. 
2009) (“An ‘offense was committed other than for profit’ only 
if the offense itself was committed other than for profit, 
regardless of whether the particular defendant got, or expected 
to get, any of the money.”).   
 Second, the dispositive interpretative term in 
Application Note One is “payment” because in order to 
determine whether McClure-Potts “profited” from her 
behavior, we must determine whether the government benefits 
that she received constitute “payment” or “expectation of 
payment” for “harboring” Samarin in her home.  U.S.S.G. 
                                              
In the circumstances, we are persuaded that the 1998 
Guidelines reflect a substantive change to § 2L1.1 
Application Note 1 rather than a clarification. 
Kim, 193 F.3d at 578. 
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§ 2L1.1(b)(1), App. n.1.5  Since the term “payment” is not 
defined anywhere in U.S.S.G. § 2L1.1(b)(1), we must use the 
term’s ordinary meaning.  See United States v. Loney, 219 F.3d 
                                              
 5 The Government focuses on the plain meaning of the 
term “profit.”  See Gov’t Br. at 21-22.  In particular, it relies on 
the definition of “profit” found in Webster’s Third, which reads 
as follows: 
1: an advantage, benefit, accession of good, gain or 
valuable return esp. in financial matters, education or 
character development. 
Id. at 22 (quoting Webster’s Third New International 
Dictionary 1811 (3rd ed. 2002)).  The Government argues that 
this definition of profit “easily captures the benefits that 
McClure-Potts enjoyed as a result of her harboring Samarin” 
(presumably because it contains the word “benefit”).  Id.   
 However, the Government focuses on the wrong 
interpretative word.  We need not consider the definition of 
“profit” in Webster’s Third because Application Note One 
already contains a definition for “other than for profit.”  See 
Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38, (1993) 
(“[C]ommentary in the Guidelines Manual that interprets or 
explains a guideline is authoritative unless it violates the 
Constitution or a federal statute, or is inconsistent with, or a 
plainly erroneous reading of, that guideline.”); United States v. 
Loney, 219 F.3d 281, 284 (3d Cir. 2000) (stating that only 
“undefined terms” in the guidelines should be given their 
“meaning in ordinary usage” (emphasis added)).   
   
Case: 17-2987     Document: 003113081943     Page: 13      Date Filed: 11/08/2018
14 
 
281, 284 (3d Cir. 2000) (“[W]e should interpret undefined 
terms in the guidelines, as in statutes, using the terms’ meaning 
in ordinary usage”).  Webster’s Third defines “payment” as:  
1 : the act of paying or giving compensation : the 
discharge of a debt or an obligation . . . 2 : 
something that is paid : something given to 
discharge a debt or obligation or to fulfill a 
promise.  
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1659 (3rd ed. 
2002).  And Black’s Law Dictionary defines “payment” as  
1. Performance of an obligation by the delivery 
of money or some other valuable thing accepted 
in partial or full discharge of the 
obligation. 2. The money or other valuable thing 
so delivered in satisfaction of an obligation.   
Payment, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).  From these 
definitions, we gather that the tax and assistance benefits that 
McClure-Potts sought out, requested, and received were 
“payment” for her harboring Samarin because the 
Government, by providing such benefits, was “discharge[ing] 
. . . an obligation” that it owed to her.6  Id.; Webster’s Third 
                                              
 6 Indeed, in Goldberg v. Kelly, the Supreme Court 
characterized the receipt of such benefits as a “right[]” that the 
Government owes to its citizens:   
It may be realistic today to regard welfare entitlements 
as more like ‘property’ than a ‘gratuity.’ Much of the 
existing wealth in this country takes the form of rights 
that do not fall within traditional common-law concepts 
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New International Dictionary 1659 (3rd ed. 2002)).  
Furthermore, the PSR provides that McClure-Potts received 
additional benefits from Samarin himself, including doing 
household work in McClure-Potts’s home, completing some of 
her college course-work for her, and turning over any money 
that he earned to her.   
 This interpretation is consistent with that of other courts 
of appeals, which have construed the term “payment” in 
Application Note One in a broad and flexible manner:  
According to the Sentencing Commission, “‘The 
offense was committed other than for profit’ 
means that there was no payment or expectation 
of payment for the smuggling, transporting, or 
harboring of any of the unlawful aliens.” 
U.S.S.G. § 2L1.1 Application Note 1 ¶ 1. Perez-
Ruiz received in-kind compensation-
transportation from Arizona to Chicago-for his 
role in the offense. He contends that in-kind 
compensation cannot be “payment,” but this is 
untenable. Compensation is payment, and 
                                              
of property. . . . ‘Such sources of security, whether 
private or public, are no longer regarded as luxuries or 
gratuities; to the recipients they are essentials, fully 
deserved, and in no sense a form of charity. It is only 
the poor whose entitlements, although recognized by 
public policy, have not been effectively enforced.’  
397 U.S. 254, 263 n.8 (1970) (citation omitted). 
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whether in specie or in some other form does not 
matter. . . .  
Perez-Ruiz valued the trip to Chicago. He 
received some “payment” for his acts, and as 
even a modest payment counts as “profit” the 
judgment must be affirmed. 
United States v. Perez-Ruiz, 169 F.3d 1075, 1076-77 (7th Cir. 
1999); see also United States v. Juan-Manuel, 222 F.3d 480, 
484-85 (8th Cir. 2000) (“[W]e hold that the words ‘payment’ 
and ‘expectation of payment,’ as used in the November 1997 
commentary, can refer to something other than money.”).  It is 
also consistent with the stated purpose of the 1997 Amendment 
to Application Note One, which was intended to “narrow 
somewhat the class of cases that would qualify for the reduced 
offense level under [§ 2L1.1(b)(1)].”    U.S.S.G., Amendment 
561 (1997).   
 Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s finding 
that McClure-Potts did not qualify for the § 2L1.1(b)(1) three 
offense level reduction. 
B. Samarin’s Testimony 
 McClure-Potts contends that the District Court’s factual 
findings—where the District Court credited Samarin’s 
versions of the events rather than hers—was “clearly 
erroneous.”  Appellant Br. at 20.7  According to her, “the 
District Court’s factual findings were clearly erroneous as the 
                                              
 7 “[W]e review the District Court’s . . . findings of fact 
for clear error.”  Kluger, 722 F.3d at 555. 
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court reached its findings by crediting the self-serving 
statements of an illegal alien, who pleaded guilty in federal 
court of falsifying documents and lying to law enforcement.”  
Appellant Br. at 20.  She also contends that Samarin was not 
available for cross-examination, and that—although hearsay 
testimony may be introduced at a sentencing hearing—his 
testimony lacked the requisite “sufficient indicia of reliability 
to support its probable accuracy.”  Id. (quoting United States v. 
Robinson, 482 F.3d 244, 246 (3d Cir. 2007)).   
 The District Court’s findings, however, do not meet the 
clear error standard, which requires that its findings be either 
“completely devoid of minimum evidentiary support 
displaying some hue of credibility, or . . . bear[] no rational 
relationship to the supportive evidentiary data.”  United States 
v. Williams, 898 F.3d 323, 332 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting United 
States v. Antoon, 933 F.2d 200, 204 (3d Cir. 1991)).  Here, the 
District Court provided the following reasoning for its 
findings:  
The Court obviously had to assess the credibility 
of the Defendants. And the Court accepts 
Samarin’s versions of the events surrounding the 
relationship between the parties. 
The following reasons for accepting Samarin’s 
version are as follows: One, Mrs. Potts has 
admitted that she lied to the Social Security 
Administration; two, she has three convictions 
for theft by deception; three, she has a conviction 
for bad checks, and the factual background for 
that offense shows an attempt to defraud another 
of property; four, when she reported Samarin’s 
illegal status to the police, she lied about his 
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stealing weapons from the school ROTC; five, 
the pictures of cards and notes that were 
exchanged between the parties appear to this 
person to be, in some instances, contrived; there 
are no dates on these exhibits and no foundation 
that Samarin in fact created them; six, Mrs. Potts 
did not report Samarin’s true identity to the 
Dauphin and York County Assistance Offices. 
Mr. Samarin’s version of events is corroborated 
by many of the documents in this case. 
App. 134.  The District Court’s explanation reflects a sufficient 
consideration of the competing statements it was presented 
with, and sets forth an adequate justification for its findings.  
And while Samarin did engage in repeated instances of fraud 
and dishonest behavior, there is also little doubt that McClure-
Potts did as well (especially in light of the fact that she pled 
guilty to Social Security Fraud).  Given that the District Court 
found that Samarin’s testimony was corroborated by the 
record, its findings were based on adequate evidence that met 
the requisite “minimal indicium of reliability beyond mere 
allegation.”  Robinson, 482 F.3d at 246.  Accordingly, the 
District Court did not commit clear error by crediting 
Samarin’s testimony over that of McClure-Potts.       
C. U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(C) 
 McClure-Potts’s third and final claim on appeal is that 
the District Court erred in calculating a loss amount of 
$20,989.28 that, because it exceeded $15,000, resulted in a 
four-level increase to her total offense level pursuant to 
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U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(C).8  See Appellant Br. at 27-32.  This 
loss amount consisted of a $7,336 loss from fraudulently 
obtained earned income tax credits and $13,653.28 in 
fraudulently obtained nutritional and medical assistance.  
“[W]e review the District Court’s application of the Guidelines 
to facts for abuse of discretion.” Kluger, 722 F.3d at 555 
(quoting United States v. Tupone, 442 F.3d 145, 149 (3d Cir. 
2006)). 
i.  Food Stamps and Medical Assistance 
 McClure-Potts contends that, with respect to her 
defrauding the Government of food stamps and medical 
assistance benefits, “the ‘offense’ was applying for a false 
social security number, not using a false social security 
number” and that “[s]imply applying for a social security 
number under false pretenses does not imply that Potts knew 
that she could or would later get tax breaks and food 
stamps/assistance.”  Appellant Br. at 28.  She accordingly puts 
forth four arguments, none of which we find to be persuasive.   
 First, she argues that the food stamps and medical 
assistance benefits do not count as losses for purposes of the 
Sentencing Guidelines calculation under § 2B1.1.  “Actual 
Loss” is defined in the Guidelines as “the reasonably 
foreseeable pecuniary harm that resulted from the offense.”  
                                              
 8 Section 2B1.1(b)(1)(C) provides that, for offenses that 
include, inter alia, fraud and deceit, a four-level enhancement 
is added to a defendant’s total offense level if the loss to the 
victim exceeded $15,000. 
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U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1, App. n.3(A)(i).  And “reasonably 
foreseeable pecuniary harm” means “pecuniary harm that the 
defendant knew or, under the circumstances, reasonably should 
have known, was a potential result of the offense.”  Id., App. 
n.3(A)(iv).  In McClure-Potts’s estimation, “there is nothing in 
the record to establish that [she] reasonably knew or should 
have known the potential results that could flow from the 
[fraudulent] application for the [social security] card.”  
Appellant Br. at 29.  However, her argument misrepresents the 
record: McClure-Potts ultimately used both the application for 
and the receipt of a Social Security number to obtain the tax 
and assistance benefits that she received.  To the extent that she 
argues that she was never charged for using the fraudulently 
obtained Social Security number, it is well established that a 
district court can sentence someone based on criminal activity 
that was not charged in the indictment.  See, e.g., United States 
v. Baird, 109 F.3d 856, 869 (3d Cir. 1997) (“[I]t is clear that 
the Guidelines envisioned that sentencing courts would 
consider at least some conduct for which a defendant was not 
actually charged.”); United States v. Tidwell, 521 F.3d 236, 
250 n.9 (3d Cir. 2008) (“It is now well established in this circuit 
that facts that only enhance sentences within the range allowed 
by the jury’s verdict (or guilty plea) need not be charged in an 
indictment or proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” (citing 
United States v. Grier, 449 F.3d 558 (3d Cir. 2006) (en banc))).  
Furthermore, the argument that it was not “reasonably 
foreseeable” to McClure-Potts that she would use the 
fraudulent Social Security number to receive government 
benefits is, on its face, difficult to fathom.  
 Second, McClure-Potts contends that the purported 
losses that accrued from her obtainment of medical assistance 
benefits and food stamps—which is $13,653.28—cannot inure 
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to her detriment because they are unrelated to her federal 
offense.9  According to her, “these pending state charges are 
separate and distinct offenses from the instant federal offense 
and cannot in anyway be considered relevant conduct . . . 
because the Commonwealth is not a ‘victim’ as set forth in the 
indictment, or as defined in U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1, App. n.1; the 
only ‘victim’ is the Commissioner of Social Security.”10  
Appellant Br. at 30.  However, just because the Commissioner 
of Social Security was not the only victim does not excuse 
McClure-Potts’s fraudulent actions from falling within the 
ambit of § 2B1.1.  Specifically, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(3) 
provides that base levels like § 2B1.1 must account for “all 
harm that resulted from the acts or omissions . . . and all harm 
that was the object of such acts and omissions.”  U.S.S.G. 
§ 1B1.3(a)(3).11  Her receipt of the tax and assistance benefits 
                                              
 9 McClure-Potts is currently charged with fraudulently 
obtaining food stamps and medical assistance in the Dauphin 
County Court of Common Pleas in Harrisburg, PA.  
 10 The term “victim” under § 2B1.1 means “any person 
who sustained any part of the actual loss determined . . . .” 
U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1, App. n.1.  “Person” includes “individuals, 
corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, 
societies, and joint stock companies.” Id. 
 11 The District Court relied on U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3—the 
Guidelines’ relevant conduct provision—in setting the loss 
amount: 
The Court considers these losses to be part of relevant 
conduct.  Under the sentencing guidelines, relevant 
conduct consists of all acts and omissions committed, 
aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, 
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directly “resulted” from her filing of a fraudulent application 
to get that Social Security number – accordingly, it falls within 
the ambit of the relevant conduct that the District Court could 
permissibly assess at sentencing.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Coe, 79 F.3d 126, 127 (11th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he broad language 
of § 1B1.3(a) is clear: relevant conduct includes all acts that 
occurred during the commission of the offense.”). 
 Third, she argues that the $13,653.28 in state assistance 
that she was not entitled to receive was disbursed to her from 
March 2013 to March 2016 (a period of thirty-six months), but 
that the offense conduct charged in the indictment ran only 
from January 15, 2013 to December 23, 2013 (a period of 
twelve months).  Thus, she contends that the only amount of 
loss that can be attributed to the victim from her is $4,551.09 
(which is one-third of $13,653.28).  Again, pursuant to 
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(3), the fraud that spanned through March 
2016 constitutes relevant conduct.  Indeed, we have previously 
stated in a case involving wire fraud that “[t]he determination 
of loss and other factors pertinent to a fraudulent scheme is 
never confined to the date of the charged mailing or wiring, but 
always encompasses all relevant conduct that was part of the 
same course of conduct or common scheme or plan.”  United 
                                              
procured, or willfully caused by the Defendant, and all 
harm that resulted from the acts and omissions of the 
underlying crime, and all harm that was the object of 
such acts and omission.  Each time the illegally obtained 
social security number was used was relevant conduct 
under the guidelines.  
App. 132. 
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States v. Siddons, 660 F.3d 699, 704 (3d Cir. 2011) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
 Fourth, she contends that the amount of loss may not 
have been calculated properly because “the calculations do not 
make clear whether these alleged losses are only the additional 
payments she received as a result of adding Samarin, or if this 
amount includes payments she was entitled to receive, even 
without adding Samarin.”  Appellant Br. at 30.   
 However, it was McClure-Potts’s burden to show that 
the amount of benefits proven by the Government was over-
inflated.12  See United States v. McDowell, 888 F.2d 285, 290 
n.1 (3d Cir. 1989) (“The party challenging the [pre-sentence] 
report then has the burden of production”).  Here, she has not 
produced evidence showing that the District Court 
                                              
 12 “The Government bears the burden of establishing, 
by a preponderance of the evidence, the amount of loss for 
purposes of sentencing enhancement.”  United States v. 
Jimenez, 513 F.3d 62, 86 (3d Cir. 2008).  Once the Government 
makes out a prima facie case of the loss amount, however, the 
burden of production shifts to the defendant to provide 
evidence that the Government’s evidence is incomplete or 
inaccurate.  Id.  Here, the Government met its burden of 
providing a prima facie loss amount through the provision of 
two extensively supported reports from the Pennsylvania 
Office of the Inspector General, Bureau of Fraud Prevention 
and Prosecution on the fraud perpetrated by McClure-Potts and 
her husband.   
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miscalculated the amount, and therefore her argument is of no 
avail. 
ii.  Federal Tax Losses 
 The PSR provides that Potts fraudulently received 
$7,336 between 2012 and 2015 in federal tax benefits.  
McClure-Potts repeats many of the same arguments above for 
why this amount should not be included in a loss calculation.  
She contends that (1) these losses are not “reasonably 
foreseeable pecuniary harm” that resulted from the offense 
(i.e., that she did not know or reasonably should have known 
that they would result from the offense); (2) the loss of the tax 
revenue accrued to the Commissioner of the IRS, not the 
Commissioner of Social Security; and (3) the loss figure of 
$7,336 spans 2012 to 2015, beyond the scope of the indictment.   
 However, for the reasons discussed above, these 
arguments fail because (1) it was reasonably foreseeable that 
she would defraud the government with a fraudulently 
obtained Social Security card; and (2) it is of no moment that 
the loss accrued to the Commissioner of the IRS or that the loss 
occurred beyond the scope of the indictment because the 
conduct still constitutes “relevant conduct” under U.S.S.G. § 
1B1.3(a)(3).  Accordingly, we reject these contentions and will 
affirm the District Court.  
III. CONCLUSION 
 For the aforementioned reasons, we will affirm the 
District Court’s judgment of conviction.  
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